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SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS ON INDIVIDUALS:
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 415.20(b)
With the adoption of Senate Bill 503, California updates its law
on jurisdiction and service of process, which has remained almost wholly
unchanged since 1872. One of the most significant provisions of this
legislation is new section 415.20(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which authorizes substituted service of process on individuals. Effec-
tive July 1, 1970, this section provides:
If a copy of the summons and of the complaint cannot with rea-
sonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served
as specified in [sections delineating certain individual defendants,
including minors, wards or conservatees, candidates for public of-
fice, and other individuals and their agents], a summons may be
served by leaving a copy of the summons and of the complaint at
such person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, or usual place
of business in the presence of a competent member of the house-
hold or a person apparently in charge of his office or place of
business, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the
contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons
and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid), to the
person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and
of the complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner
is deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing.1
Substituted service, or service by leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint at a defendant's home or place of business in his ab-
sence, has never before been authorized in California as a method for
serving an individual defendant.2 In order to determine what acts will
be sufficient to effect valid service under the new statute, therefore,
California courts will be forced to turn to decisions in other jurisdictions.
Forty-three states now allow substituted service on individual defend-
ants,3 and substituted service has been authorized by statute in the fed-
eral system since at least 1842, when the old Equity Rules, forerunners
1. CAL. CODE Cv. PRoc. § 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
2. Service of notice on a party or his attorney can be effected in a manner simi-
lar to that of substituted service of summons as provided in new section 415.20(b).
The notice may be served by delivering it to the office of the attorney or the abode of
the party between certain hours during a business day provided the delivery is made to
a person at least 18 years of age. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1011.
3. E.g., OHIo RFv. CODE ANN. § 2703.08 (Page 1954); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 262.06 (Supp. 1969); PA. R. Civ. P. 1009(b)(1)-(2). All other states and the
District of Columbia recognize substituted service of summons on an individual de-
fendant except for Alabama, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, and
Tennessee.
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of the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were adopted.4  In
forecasting what interpretation California courts will give to the various
provisions of section 415.20(b), it is necessary to see how these juris-
dictions have interpreted similar provisions in the light of the limitations
imposed by the constitutional requirements of due process.
In service of process questions, courts have traditionally measured
due process by the well-settled rule that
a fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action. . . . Such notice must be of such nature as reasonably
to convey the required information . . . and it must afford a rea-
sonable time for those interested to make their appearance ....
But if with due regard to practicalities and peculiarities of the case
these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements
are satisfied.5
Generally, courts have considered the due process requirements to have
been reasonably met if the plaintiff at least substantially complies with
the statutory provisions. 6 In such cases, service will be upheld whether
or not the defendant has received actual notice.' In contrast, in some
relatively recent cases, courts have held service to be effective even with-
out substantial compliance with statutory requirements, if the attempted
method of service results in actual notice. 8 The essence of this liberal
construction theory is explained in Karlsson v. Rabinowitz:9
[W]here actual notice of the commencement of the action and the
duty to defend has been received by the one served, the provisions
. . . should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold
the jurisdiction of the court, thus insuring the opportunity for a
trial on the merits.10
On first impression, some courts following this liberal approach
appear to uphold service solely on the basis of actual notice;" but in
fact no court has actually asserted jurisdiction on this fortuitous basis
4. J. HOPKINs, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES ANNOTATED 45 (8th ed. 1935).
5. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)
(emphasis added).
6. McCall v. Gates, 354 Pa. 158, 47 A.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Legislative
rules as to service of process are in derogation of the common law and must be
strictly construed. Id. at 161, 47 A.2d at 213.
7. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914); see Walker v. Hutchison, 352
U.S. 112, 114-16 (1956) (Court holds that actual notice is to be given if feasible, noting
there may be cases where it is not possible to give actual notice).
8. See, e.g., Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963); Rovinski v.
Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942).
9. 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963).
10. Id. at 668.
11. See, e.g., Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1967); Skidmore v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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alone. The better reasoned cases utilizing the liberal construction theory
emphasize the fact that actual notice by itself is not enough and that a
liberal construction is justified only where the deviation from substantial
compliance with the statute is not extreme.
1 2
Despite the conflict between the strict and liberal approaches, it
is submitted that the California courts in construing section 415.20(b)
should, where appropriate, selectively incorporate aspects of both
theories, since each case should be determined on its facts. 13  Such an
approach would provide flexibility and avoid the undesirable results
that could follow from adherence to the strict construction approach in
every case. 14 Where there is substantial compliance with the statutory
requirements of substituted service, service should be sustained whether
or not the defendant receives actual notice.' 5 To hold otherwise would
defeat the purpose of allowing substituted service; for if the defendant
had to receive actual notice of the proceeding, the only reliable method
of service would be in-hand personal service. Due process cannot be
said to require such a result. On the other hand, if the defendant re-
ceives actual notice, substantial compliance becomes unimportant and
service should be upheld,' so long as the summons is not served in a
manner which deviates so far from the method prescribed by statute that
service can be sustained only if the statute is given an unnatural and
artificial construction.'
7
The balance of this Note will analyze the various provisions of the
California substituted service statute. This analysis will project the
probable judicial construction of each provision in the statute and also
12. See, e.g., Frasca v. Eubank, 24 F.R.D. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1959). In this case the
court stated: "Rule 4(d)(1) should be construed liberally to effectuate service where
actual notice of the suit has been received by the defendant. The fact of actual notice
is not enough, however. There must be compliance with the directions of the rule and
the terms [of the statute] cannot be given an artificial meaning." Id. at 270 (cita-
tions omitted); see Berner v. Farney, 11 F.R.D. 506 (D.N.J. 1951); Blane v. Young,
10 F.R.D. 109 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Zuckerman v. McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739 (E.D. Mo.
1947).
13. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968), where the court declined to "follow and perpetuate" the rigid common law
classifications of invitees, licensees, and trespassers and the duty of an occupier of
property to each.
14. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.11(2), at 1039 (2d ed. 1967); see Hannah
v. United States Lines Co., 151 F. Supp. 122, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); James v. Russell F.
Davis, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
15. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914).
16. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 4 (all provisions within the code are to be liberally
construed); see JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CON-
CERNING REVISION OF TITLE V (COMMENCING ,WITH SECTION 405) OF THE CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF CALIFORNIA COURTS (unpub-
lished), Aug. 26, 1968, at 33 [hereinafter cited as Unpublished Report].
17. See, e.g., Frasca v. Eubank, 24 F.R.D. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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determine how the statute will be construed where the defendant re-
ceives actual notice even though the plaintiff does not strictly comply
with the statutory requirements of substituted service.
Substituted Service at the Home or Business
Under the new California statute, substituted service may be im-
plemented in two ways. A copy of the summons and complaint may
be left either at the defendant's "dwelling house [or] usual place of
abode . . . in the presence of a competent member of the household"
or at his "usual place of business in the presence of . . .a person ap-
parently in charge of his office or place of business."1  Regardless of
which type of substituted service is used, certain conditions must be
satisfied. One, the requirement that reasonable diligence must first
be exercised to effect personal service, is a condition precedent to sub-
stituted service, while another, supplemental mailing of the summons,
is a condition subsequent. The supplemental mailing requirement is
self-explanatory and should present no significant interpretation prob-
lems.19  For this reason it is not discussed further. The reasonable
18. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970). It should be
noted, however, that even in the absence of statutory compliance service can be sus-
tained if it is shown that the recipient of the service was the defendant's agent. Serv-
ice delivered to an agent is provided for by CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 416.90 (operative
July 1, 1970). Under this section an agent includes "one who is authorized by law or
by appointment to receive service of process, and the agent of an individual for other
purposes is not necessarily authorized to receive such process." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 416.90, Judicial Council Comment (operative July 1, 1970).
This narrow construction of the term "agent" will be of very little assistance to
the plaintiff who totally fails to comply with the substituted service statute. There is
authority, however, for broadening the scope of the term to include those persons
whose relationship with the defendant is "close and enduring enough" to make it highly
probable that the defendant would receive actual notice. Unpublished Report, supra
note 16, at 33; see Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d
870 (Sup. Ct. 1963); McBaine, Service Upon a Non-Resident by Service Upon his
Agent, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 482 (1935). Enlargement of the scope of the term "agent"
could have a significant effect on substituted service attempted under new section
415.20(b). Regardless of the lack of compliance with section 415.20(b) or lack of ac-
tual notice, the service could still be sustained as valid service under new section 416.90
if the affidavit is amended and the recipient of the summons qualifies as the defendant's
agent.
19. An argument can be made that the supplemental mailing requirement is un-
necessary. Its purpose is to increase the probability of actual notice; but if the re-
mainder of the statute is complied with, the defendant will almost always receive actual
notice from the service anyway. Further, the mailing requirement does not reduce the
delay in giving the defendant actual notice. Such notice would not validate service
where there is no attempt to comply with the rest of the substituted service statute.
From this the conclusion follows that the supplemental mailing requirement is unwise
because the slight benefit it affords the defendant is outweighed by the detriment it
places on the plaintiff by making compliance more difficult. Thus, a possible loophole
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diligence requirement, on the other hand, may present complex prob-
lems of interpretation. This requirement is discussed at length follow-
ing the analysis of the two types of substituted service. 0
Two other requirements must also be met to effect substituted
service under the statute. The person receiving the summons must be
at least 18 years of age21 and must be informed of the contents of the
summons upon receiving it. Both of these requirements are for the
most part self-explanatory, and so, like the supplemental mailing pro-
vision, are not discussed further in this article.
"At2 [the] Dwelling House [or] Usual Place of Abode... In
the Presence of a Competent Member of the Household"
"Dwelling House" or "Usual Place of Abode"
The use of the phrase "dwelling house or usual place of abode" is
would be provided by which the defendant might escape the litigation because of
inadequate service. It is submitted that this contention should be rejected since com-
plying with the mailing provision in fact requires little effort by the plaintiff and the
supplemental mailing of the summons does increase the probability that the defendant
will receive actual notice.
20. See text accompanying notes 87-122 infra.
21. It is arguable that under the liberal construction theory the age requirement,
like the other provisions, should be liberally construed. This would mean that if the
process server believed that the recipient was 18 years of age or older and had reason-
able grounds for so believing, then the service would be upheld if the defendant re-
ceived actual notice. However, this interpretation probably was not intended by the
legislature, since a specific age limit was provided in the statute rather than a phrase
such as "a person of suitable age and discretion," as is used in FED. R. Civ. P 4(d)
(1).
22. Many older cases questioned the meaning of "at" in the limitation "at the
dwelling house or usual place of abode." Defendants seeking to avoid service con-
tended that "at" meant "in" the dwelling house, and therefore if the recipient was
given the summons any place outside the structure, the service would not be good. In
resolving these disputes, courts generally interpreted "at" to mean "in proximity with"
and thereby held service good if the summons was delivered to a proper person who
was "near" the house. Shephard v. Hopson, 191 Ark. 284, 291, 86 S.W.2d 30, 33-34
(1935). Using this reasoning, service has been sustained where the summons was
given to the recipient within 20 feet of the abode, Bursow v. Doerr, 96 Neb. 219, 147
N.W. 474 (1914), in the dooryard within 30 feet of the house, Pacific Loan & Inv.
Co. v. Superior Court, 84 Wash. 392, 146 P. 834 (1915), and at the gate of the yard-
25 to 40 feet from the house, Alberts v. Brubaker, 72 S.D. 220, 31 N.W.2d 769 (1948).
Service has also been held good when the summons was delivered to a person standing
in a field 200 feet from the residence, Shephard v. Hopson, supra, and where the per-
son receiving the summons was standing in a road leading to the house, Lino v. Hole,
150 Wash. 16, 291 P. 1079 (1930). But see Kibbe v. Benson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 624
(187-3), where the Court, interpreting an Illinois statute, held that service made within
125 feet of the abode and within the curtilage was not good. The Court went on to
say that if the process had been left nearer the abode, valid service would have been
made. Id. at 629.
This question has not arisen in recent years but should it arise in California, service
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quite common in substituted service statutes. It is contained in numer-
ous state statutes 23 as well as in the Federal Rules.24  The comment to
the new California provision states that in the new statute "[ihe terms
'dwelling house' and 'usual place of abode' take their meaning from the
Federal Rules.125  Even though this reduces the number of cases that
must be considered in order to anticipate how these phrases will be
construed, there are still significant problems involved in interpreting
these terms. The relevant federal provision is Federal Rule 4(d) (1),
which provides that the summons may be left at the defendant's "dwell-
ing house or usual place of abode. '26 Before any workable definition
may be derived from this provision, it is necessary to determine the
relationship between these two terms. This, however, is a difficult
task because the federal courts, with one exception, have failed to make
any differentiation between them.
The exception, Pickford v. Kravetz,2 7 involved attempted service on
a hotel guest by leaving the summons with the hotel manager. In sus-
taining service, the court concluded: "The terms 'dwelling house' and
'usual place of abode' are disjunctively stated in the rule and mean
alternatives. 28 In line with this reasoning, the court held that although
the hotel could not be the defendant's "usual place of abode," it could
be considered his "dwelling place [house]. 29  The case has been criti-
cized on the ground that the service was sustained because of the de-
fendant's blatant attempts to avoid service,3 0  rather than because
service actually complied with the statute as the court construed it.
31
However, no fault has been found with the court's distinction between
"dwelling house" and "usual place of abode" and this differentiation
seems desirable.
Although no other federal cases have attempted to distinguish
these terms, several observations are in order. First, it makes little dif-
ference in the ordinary case whether a distinction is made. The plain
meanings of "dwelling house" and "usual place of abode" are so similar
as to encompass generally the same boundaries. Second, a California
should be sustained if the process server is reasonably near the residence when he hands
the copy of the summons to a member of the household.
23. See, e.g., IDAHo R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1); N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:4-4.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)
25. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 415.20(b), Judicial Council Comment (operative
July 1, 1970).
26. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(1).
27. 17 FED. RULEs SERV. 4d.121, Case 1, at 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
28. Id. at 20.
29. Id.
30. The court expressly admitted that the defendant's attempts to avoid service
and his conspiracy with the hotel manager to accomplish this purpose were enough in
themselves to find that the hotel was the defendant's dwelling place. Id. at 21.
31. 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 411(2), at 1040, 1047 (1967).
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court could rely on Pickford to justify treating the terms disjunctively
in borderline cases. This differentiation would allow a court to sustain
service where summons was served at the defendant's temporary resi-
dence rather than at his permanent home. In this regard, "usual place
of abode," as it is generally defined, would be "the place where [the
defendant] is actually [and permanently] living, except for temporary
absences, at the time service is made. '32  "Dwelling house," on the
other hand, could be logically treated as the defendant's place of actual
residence, with little regard to the permanency of such residence.33
Finally, in cases where compliance with this provision is questionable,
the receipt of actual notice by the defendant should be the controlling
factor.
Certain conclusions can be drawn from these suggestions. If the
defendant is living in what he calls his permanent home, there can be no
question that service there would be service at the defendant's "usual
place of abode. '34  Such service should be valid even if the defendant
did not receive actual notice. Similarly, if the defendant is temporarily
absent from his permanent home, service made at his permanent home
should also be sustained under the ordinary definition of "usual place
of abode. 35  In addition, using the suggested definition for "dwelling
house,"3 a temporary residence should qualify as a proper place where
substituted service could effectively be made. Of course, if the defendant
receives actual notice, the same result can be reached by a liberal in-
terpretation of the new California statute whether or not the courts
make any differentiation between "usual place of abode" and "dwelling
house. '37  Actual notice affords the defendant an adequate opportunity
to be heard, and upholding such service would not require an unjusti-
fiably liberal construction.3
Three fact situations, in which copies of the summons and com-
plaint are not left at a place falling within any of the above suggested
32. Id. at 1040; see Hannah v. United States Lines Co., 151 F. Supp. 122, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). If the defendant is temporarily residing away from his permanent
home when the service is left there, the court will still conclude that this permanent
home is a usual place of abode if there is a considerable likelihood of the defendant
returning to that place. See McFadden v. Shore, 60 F. Supp. 8, 9 (E.D. Pa. 1945); cf.
James v. Russell F. Davis, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
33. Unpublished Report, supra note 16, at 33.
34. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
35. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
36. See Pickford v. Kravetz, 17 FED. RULES SERV. 4d.121, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Unpublished Report, supra note 16, at 33.
37. Cf. Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963); Rovinski v. Rowe,
131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942).
38. However, some federal cases have rejected service in similar situations. See
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Ingerton, 207 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1953); cf. McFad-
den v. Shore, 60 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa.1945).
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categories, deserve more detailed analysis. These situations involve the
defendant with no abode, the defendant who is absent from a tempo-
rary residence, and the defendant in the process of moving.
If the defendant has no abode within the definition of the Cali-
fornia and federal statutes, substituted service has been sustained where
he receives actual notice, providing the summons is left at a place with
which the defendant has some substantial connection. Two cases illus-
trate this result. In Rovinski v. Rowe,"0 a leading case in support of the
concept of "liberal construction after actual notice," the summons was
left at the home of the defendant's mother. The defendant, who had
moved out of his mother's house over 10 years before, had never estab-
lished a permanent residence elsewhere. In sustaining service, the court
said the provision "should be construed liberally, to effectuate service
where actual notice of suit has been received by the defendant.""0
Service was also upheld, but on somewhat different facts, in Skidmore
v. Green.41 That case involved service on a retired policeman who
spent most of his time traveling around the country in a trailer. The
court sustained substituted service at his brother's home, stating: "[S]o
far as the migratory nature of [the defendant's] life permits of any
place of abode or dwelling house, it is [his brother's house]."42  Though
neither result could have been reached without a liberal construction of
the provision on place of service, both holdings seem justified because
the defendant was not deprived of his right to be heard and also because
of the inherent difficulty in personally serving a transient.
Service on a defendant by leaving the summons at an occasional
residence, which he is not then occupying, such as a winter home
43
or home maintained for periodic use,44 has been rejected by the one
federal case in point. In Shore v. Cornell-Dubilier Electric Corp.,
45
service at a periodic residence resulted in actual notice, but the court
quashed service because the summons was not left at the defendant's
"usual and normal" residence.4 6 Although a finding that the occasional
home was a dwelling house or usual place of abode even though the
defendant was not then living there would have required a liberal con-
struction of the statute, it is suggested that this would have been a more
desirable result. In an oft-cited Florida case, Merritt v. Heffernan,
47
service was sustained in a similar situation where the defendant received
39. 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942).
40. Id. at 689.
41. 33 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
42. Id. at 530.
43. See Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940).
44. See Shore v. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., 33 F.R.D. 5 (D. Mass. 1963).
45. 33 F.R.D. 5 (D. Mass. 1963).
46. Id. at 7.
47. 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940).
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actual notice through summons served at his winter home several days
after he had returned to his permanent residence. Where the defendant
receives actual notice, sustaining such service neither hinders the de-
fendant's opportunity to be heard nor gives an artificial meaning to the
phrase "dwelling house or usual place of abode."
In the cases involving attempted service on a defendant in the
process of moving, the federal courts, relying on the liberal construction
theory, have sustained service where the summons is left at the home
which the defendant has recently and permanently vacated. In Karls-
son v. Rabinowitz,48 the court upheld the service left with the defend-
ant's wife at his former home, even though she had remained there
solely for the purpose of settling the family's affairs before joining her
husband in their new home. In sustaining service, the court emphasized
the fact that the defendant, by receiving actual notice, had been assured
of "the opportunity of a trial on the merits."'4 9
It should be noted that in cases similar to those outlined above
if the place of service does not comply with either the settled definition
of "usual place of abode" or the suggested definition of "dwelling
house," the service should not be sustained unless the defendant receives
actual notice. The reason is that in the absence of actual notice it could
not be successfully urged that it was sufficiently probable the defendant
would receive actual notice and thereby have an adequate opportunity
to be heard.
Although the comment to section 415.20(b) states that the mean-
ings of "dwelling house" and "usual place of abode" are to be derived
from the Federal Rules,50 California courts must still decide on the
basis of the available federal cases the relationship between the two
terms and their intended meanings. In both the abstract conclusions
and the specific cases discussed in this section, the results advocated
are those intended to preserve the defendant's right to adequate notice
without unduly burdening the plaintiff in attempting to have his claim
adjudicated. Two concepts drawn from cases under the Federal Rules
have provided the basis for these suggested results. First, if the de-
fendant receives actual notice the two terms should be liberally defined
to allow service to be sustained, so long as a purely artificial construc-
48. 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963).
49. Id. at 668. The court also relied on Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496,
195 So. 145 (1940). See text accompanying note 43 supra. The court in Karisson
noted that Merritt recognized correctly that the place where the defendant's family was
living would be a proper place to leave the service. Id. at 669; accord, Blaw-Knox
Co. v. Miller's Gold Seal Dairy, Inc., 14 FaD. RuLEs SERV. 4d.121, Case 1 (N.D.
Ohio 1950) (same result as Karlsson on similar facts).
50. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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tion is not necessary to find compliance. 5' Second, "dwelling house"
should be distinguished from "usual place of abode" in order to give
the plaintiff a reasonably wider range of places at which to make valid
substituted service.52 This extension is justified because it does not
impair the defendant's right to proper notice.
"Competent Member of the Household"
Valid substituted service requires that the summons be delivered
to a proper person, as well as to the proper place. Under the California
statute, a proper person is a "competent member of the [defendant's]
household."53  The individual receiving the service must be at least 18
years of age, but beyond this requirement the statute sets out no condi-
tions of competency. The California courts, then, will have to deter-
mine competency by considering due process requirements. This means
that the person on whom summons is served must be of such competency
that service on him will be reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice to the defendant. He must understand both the significance of
the service and his duty to inform the defendant promptly of its con-
tents.
The interpretation of the phrase "member of the household" pre-
sents more difficult problems. Despite the fact that there are numerous
substituted service statutes in this country, California's new statute is
the only one in which this phrase appears. Statutes in several jurisdic-
tions 4 follow the lead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pro-
vide that the summons must be left with a person "of suitable age and
discretion then residing [in the defendant's dwelling house or usual
place of abode]." 5 5  Other statutes require that the summons be de-
livered to a specified place but do not require that it be left with any
particular person.5 6 A third group of statutes provides that the sum-
mons is to be left with a "member of the [defendant's] family.
'57
Although it is not completely clear why the word "household" is
used in the California provision, several reasons may have prompted its
use. One probable reason is that the term "household" allows the
California courts to avoid the undesirable results possible under the
51. Frasca v. Eubank, 24 F.R.D. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Berner v. Farney, 11
F.R.D. 506 (D.N.J. 1951); Blane v. Young, 10 F.R.D. 109 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Zucker-
man v McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
52. See text accompanying notes 28, 32 & 33 supra.
53. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
54. E.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 403(A).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) (emphas's added).
56. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510:2 (1968).
57. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13.2 (Smith-Hurd 1958) (provides that
service may be left with some person of the family).
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various types of statutes used in other jurisdictions. The statutes allow-
ing the summons to be left with any person residing in the defendant's
residence are too broad to insure adequate notice in every case. It is
apparent that in some instances a person may qualify to receive sum-
mons for the defendant because he lives in the same residence; yet he
may have so little contact with the defendant that he will feel no compul-
sion to relate the contents of the summons to the defendant."' Even
more unsatisfactory in this regard are the statutes that provide only the
place where the service must be left, without requiring it to be left with
any particular person. The chance that the defendant will not receive
actual notice of the summons when it is merely left at his abode seems
great enough that these statutes may not satisfy the requirements of
due process. Of the three statutory limitations, "member of the family"
is the most satisfactory. Its use realistically limits the class of persons
qualified to receive service and makes it more likely that the defendant
will receive actual notice. The problem inherent in this type of statute,
however, is that "family" is ordinarily interpreted to exclude any person
not living under the same roof as the defendant.59
In most situations, the term "household," adopted by the Cali-
fornia legislature, should not produce results different from those
reached under statutes allowing service on a "member of the family."
The terms, while not synonymous, are sufficiently similar that the cases
interpreting "family" are quite useful in analyzing the California "house-
hold" provision. Beginning with the most obvious situation, it can
be said that the defendant's spouse and blood relatives who are residing
with him and are otherwise competent to receive service will almost al-
ways be considered members of the "family."60  However, any blood
relatives, even members of the defendant's immediate family, who are
merely visiting the defendant and living elsewhere will not be members
of the "family" for the purpose of receiving service for the defendant. 61
In defining "family" the better reasoned cases construe the term to in-
clude not only blood relatives who reside with the defendant, but also
lodgers, servants, and boarders who "dwell under the same roof" as the
defendant,6 2 although the mere fact that a nonrelative is dwelling in
58. To alleviate this problem, at least one court has implied that to be qualified
to receive the summons under such a statute, the recipient must be a member of the
defendant's family. Judson v. Judson, 8 F.R.D. 336 (D.D.C. 1943) (service not good
when made on resident manager of defendant's apartment).
59. See text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
60. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Smith, 29 Ill. App. 2d 35, 41-42, 172 N.E.2d
429, 432 (1961), which gives several definitions of family, all of which include at least
the spouse and blood relatives of the defendant living with him.
61. See, e.g., Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1935); L.J. Mueller Fur-
nace Co. v. Dreibelbis, 229 S.W. 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921).
62. Sanchez v. Randall, 31 Ill. App. 2d 41, 175 N.E.2d 645 (1961) (service held
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the same house as the defendant does not necessarily make him a mem-
ber of the family. It has been held, for example, that a nondomestic
servant or hired hand who is residing with the defendant only out of
convenience, and not because of any familial relationship, is not a
member of the family.63
In each of the above examples, it seems that the same result would
be reached under California's "household" provision. However, some
courts in construing "family" place undue emphasis on the idea that
one should not be considered a member of the family unless he "dwells
under the same roof" as the defendant. 4  Since it is not the fact of
dwelling under the same roof, but rather the recipient's nexus with
the defendant that should be controlling, it is hoped that the California
courts will construe "household" more broadly than other states have
construed "family" in at least two situations. The first involves a close
relative of the defendant who does not reside with him but does spend
a great deal of time in the defendant's abode or stays there periodically.
The second involves the nonrelative recipient who does not sleep in the
defendant's house, but does spend most of his time there and has some
close tie with the defendant, such as a permanent maid or trusted
servant might have. In neither of these situations is such a person
usually included within the meaning of "family" for the purpose of re-
ceiving summons for the defendant. 65 In view of the purpose of sub-
stituted service and the due process standards that must be met in effect-
ing valid service, it is submitted that these results are questionable. The
good when left with boarder in defendant's home); Lewis v. West Side Trust & Say.
Bank, 286 11. App. 130, 2 N.E.2d 976 (1936) (service on a maid-servant held good);
see Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Smith, 29 Ill. App. 2d 35, 172 N.E.2d 429 (1961)
(homeowner with whom defendant boarded for previous 5 years held member of de-
fendant's family for purposes of statute); Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J. Misc. 280, 154
A. 617 (Dist. Ct. 1931) (court disallowed service on nursemaid who did not live in
house, but implied that "family" would include her if she had lived in the house).
63. Kenner v. Schmidt, 448 P.2d 537 (Ore. 1968).
64. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Smith, 29 Ill. App. 2d 35, 41, 172 N.E.2d 429,
432 (1961). The court said, in holding service good when left with a boarder in the
defendant's home, that "family" means "the household, or collection of persons, in-
cluding . . . lodgers, servants, residing together, and receiving diet [and] lodging
. . . from a common. . - source, and subject to rules for their government, as members
of such household, with respect to such membership." Id. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The court cited other cases giving acceptable definitions of "fam-
ily," all of which require dwelling together in the same house. Id.
65. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (court
held janitor-servant not person of defendant's abode since he did not "reside" in
"usual place of abode" of defendant); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196
Wash. 357, 83 P.2d 221 (1938) (service disallowed where summons left with daughter
visiting defendant). But see Anchor Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 8 Ill. App. 2d 326, 132
N.E.2d 81 (1956) (service upheld where made by leaving summons with defendant's
sister who lived next door but spent a great deal of time in defendant's apartment).
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defendant's right to actual and timely notice is no more impaired in these
situations than in those where the summons is left with a boarder or rel-
ative who, though residing with the defendant, has no close relationship
with him. Although "family" statutes have sustained service left with
the latter two persons, it seems that the defendant ordinarily would be
more likely to receive actual notice if the summons were left with the
nonresident relative or trusted servant. If the courts refuse to extend
"household" to include such persons, service left with them should still
be sustained if the defendant receives actual notice.66
"Usual Place of Business in the Presence of .. .a Person Apparently in
Charge of [the] Office or Place of Business"
Under the new California statute, substituted service may also be
effected by leaving copies of the summons and complaint "at the [de-
fendant's] usual place of business . . . in the presence of . . . [a]
person apparently in charge of his office or place of business. '' 6r Sub-
stituted service at a place of business is allowed in eight other jurisdic-
tions.68 The California statute, although using terminology similar to
that in other statutes, is unusual in its designation of both the business
location where the summons may be served and the person with whom
it may be left.
Although "usual place of business" is a common provision in
statutes that allow substituted service at a place of business, it is to be
more broadly applied in California than in other jurisdictions. The
Judicial Council Comment accompanying the statute makes this clear.
66. A problem of relatively recent origin arises where the summons is left with
the manager or landlord of the apartment house where the defendant resides. Several
cases understandably have rejected attempts at substituted service in this situation, even
under statutes which require only that the recipient of the summons be residing in the
defendant's abode. E.g., Judson v. Judson, 8 F.R.D. 336 (D.D.C. 1943); see Weiser v.
Power, 29 App. Div. 2d 640, 286 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1968) (court held landlord not mem-
ber of household as required under service of process statute concerning election
laws). However, the most recent federal case, Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th
Cir. 1967), sustained service where the summons was left with the manager of a multi-
building apartment complex. In this case, the manager and the defendant lived in sep-
arate buildings and the manager admitted that he came in contact with the defendant
only when collecting the monthly rent. In upholding service, the court relied heavily
on the fact that the defendant received actual notice, and, therefore, that liberal con-
struction of the provision to sustain the service was justified. To uphold service under
these same facts using the California "member of the household" provision would re-
quire an even more extreme application of the liberal construction theory, since it is
difficult to see how the manager could be considered a member of the household.
It is submitted, therefore, that such an extreme construction would be unwarranted.
67. CAL. CODE CIv. PROc. § 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
68. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1); TEx. R. Crv. P. 106. Other jurisdictions rec-
ognizing business-oriented substituted service include Florida, Maryland, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
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It provides that the defendant's usual place of business includes "his
customary place of employment" as well as his own "business enter-
prise," '69 and explicitly eliminates the antiquated restriction that "usual
place of business" includes only those places where the defendant is
more than a mere employee-a restriction that has burdened other juris-
dictions." ° In defining both "customary place of employment" and
"his own business enterprise," however, the comment creates some areas
of uncertainty that need to be examined.
Generally speaking, one's own business enterprise includes almost
every business enterprise owned by the defendant, either totally or
partially, with certain reasonable limitations. Where the place of busi-
ness is not the defendant's customary place of employment, it is desirable
to require at least that the defendant be actively interested in the manage-
ment or operation of the business before the business will qualify as
a place where summons may properly be served. 71 In the absence of
such a nexus with the business, the mere fact of ownership should not
be sufficient to allow the courts to sustain service, unless they choose
to construe the provision liberally when the defendant receives actual
notice.
In order to determine the validity of substituted service made at
a place of employment, it is necessary to consider the positions within
the business of both the recipient and the defendant. The defendant's
position must be examined because his customary place of employment
does not necessarily include all the physical premises of the business
that employs him. The permissible limits of the defendant's place of
employment, carved out of the total of the business premises, are de-
termined by the position the defendant occupies in the business and the
size of the business organization. If the defendant works for a small
business, his place of employment may encompass the entire business
establishment. If he works at a large corporation, however, it is not
feasible to hold that every department of the corporate complex is his
"customary place of employment. -7 2  The recipient's position must
69. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 415.20(b), Judicial Council Comment (operative
July 1, 1970).
70. See Sharp v. Valley Forge Med. Center, Inc., 422 Pa. 124, 127, 221 A.2d
185, 187 (1966); Nahrgang v. Nahrgang, 86 Pa. D. & C. 135 (C.P. 1953).
71. See Montgomery v. Piscoglio, 11 Chester County R. 50 (Pa. C.P. 1963) (mere
ownership of building, letting out apartments and stores therein, and collecting rent,
held not sufficient to qualify building as defendant's usual place of business); cf.
Kinney v. Stoer, 14 Pa. Dist. 131, 132 (1905) (defendant's place of business must be
his personal and individual business in which he has some kind of proprietary interest
and must be more than a mere place of employment).
72. Branch v. DePaul, 397 Pa. 99, 152 A.2d 703 (1959); see Tarbox v. Walters,
192 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1961), where the court held that a traveling salesman as-
signed to an exclusive territory, who checked in at the head office only a few times an-
nually, could not be effectively served by leaving the summons with the person in
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also be considered in order to determine whether he is a person "appar-
ently in charge" as required by the statute. If the recipient occupies a
position of responsibility, the relation of his position to that of the de-
fendant determines whether he is a proper recipient of substituted serv-
ice on the defendant. Even though the recipient of the summons occu-
pies a position of considerable authority in the overall business organi-
zation, he will not qualify as a person "apparently in charge" for the
purpose of receiving the summons for the defendant unless he is "ap-
parently in charge" of the particular part of the business that is the de-
fendant's "customary place of employment." These interdependent
determinations are illustrated by Branch v. DePaul,73 a Pennsylvania
case. There, summons for a defendant who was a menial laborer
in a large corporation was served on a high-ranking corporate execu-
tive. The court properly set aside the service because the place where
the service was left-the main office of the corporation--could not be
considered the defendant's place of employment within the meaning of
the statute. 74  In addition, since the defendant's place of business did
not include the main office of the corporation, the executive recipient
was excluded from being a person "for the time being in charge," as
required by the Pennsylvania statute.7 5  To have upheld service in such
a case would have unduly burdened the executive having to receive
and deliver process to all employees, regardless of their position; such
a result was clearly not within the intent of the statute.
76
Following this reasoning, the result in Branch v. DePaul probably
would have been different had the defendant himself occupied a mana-
gerial position in the firm. In such a situation, there would be no
reason why the defendant could not be served by leaving a copy of the
summons with a corporate executive at the main office of the industrial
complex, 77 since both the person with whom the summons was left
and the place where it was left would comply with the provisions of the
statute. Likewise, it seems that the two requirements would also be
fulfilled if the menial-laborer defendant were served at his job site by
delivery of the summons to his foreman or supervisor.
charge of the head office, since the head office was not his "office or place of business."
73. 397 Pa. 99, 152 A.2d 703 (1959).
74. "Does this rule allow service on any ordinary employee or must the em-
ployee be in a managerial capacity before he may be served at his 'office' or 'usual place
of business'? The contention . . . that any employee, no matter how insignificant his
position, may be served by leaving a copy of the complaint at the main office of any
vast industrial complex where he may be employed, must be rejected." Id. at 101, 152
A.2d at 704.
75. PA. R. Clv. P. 1009(b)(1)-(2).
76. Kinney v. Stoer, 14 Pa. Dist. 131, 132-33 (1905).
77. See Branch v. DePaul, 397 Pa. 99, 152 A.2d 703 (1959); Nahrgang v. Nahr-
gang, 86 Pa. D. & C. 135 (C.P. 1953).
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This type of analysis becomes strictly necessary only when it is
not clear whether the defendant received actual notice. If the defendant
did receive actual notice, it seems that a liberal construction should allow
the service to be sustained in all the situations mentioned.
Several other considerations affect the interpretation of the phrase
"person apparently in charge." The first consideration is how much
authority, if any, the recipient must have to be considered a person in
charge. A reasonable test for this determination is that an individual
may be deemed a person in charge of a business for the purpose of re-
ceiving the summons if he is in charge of a particular area of the
business and has a sufficient contact with the defendant to reasonably
insure that the defendant will receive actual notice. 78 For example,
the defendant's secretary will usually be considered a person in charge,
even though she is subordinate to her employer;" but a watchman or
janitor probably would not be a "person in charge," despite the fact
that he may have control over the physical premises.s0
The use of "apparently" in the provision influences the scope of
"person in charge of the business" in two ways: It allows the summons
to be left with one who is not actually in charge, 81 and it implies that
more than one person may be qualified to receive the service. These
expansions are desirable because in cases where the defendant has not
been prejudiced, they allow the court to avoid protracted disputes based
on mere technicalities. That the recipient of summons was not actually
in charge of the business or was "less" in charge than some other per-
son should not be material if it does not reduce the likelihood of the
defendant receiving actual notice.
8 2
A case which illustrates the desirability of including "apparently"
in the statutory provision is Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. My-
ers.8 In that case the recipient of the summons was the defendant's
former secretary. Although she had recently quit her secretarial posi-
tion, she continued to help out at the office from time to time. On the
day the summons was delivered, however, she was merely gathering up
her belongings, although she then claimed to be employed by the de-
fendant. After expressing some doubt, the court upheld the service
even though the statute required the recipient to be the "person for
78. See Kinney v. Stoer, 14 Pa. Dist. 131, 132 (1905), where the court said
the "person in charge" may be taken to mean "one who may be properly presumed
to have been vested with some authority and owing a corresponding duty to the defend-
ant sought to be fixed by such a substituted service." Id. at 132. See also Kinpacher &
Maass Silk Dyeing Co. v. Cole, 16 Pa. Dist. 1015 (1907).
79. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Myers, 290 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
80. Nahrgang v. Nahrgang, 86 Pa. D. & C. 135, 138 (C.P. 1953).
81. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Myers, 290 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the time being in charge"84 of the office or place of business. There
need be no hesitancy on the part of the California courts in reaching
the same result in a similar situation, since the defendant's former
secretary would clearly be the person "apparently" in charge of his
office.
To avoid possible hardships on the defendant by an overbroad
interpretation of "apparently," the term should not be given an entirely
literal meaning. A literal interpretation of the word would make it
possible for one to qualify as a person "apparently in charge" of a place
of business even if he neither worked there nor had any connection with
the defendant at all."' If such a person were the recipient of the
summons, the attempted service, for obvious due process reasons,
would be held inadequate. Service should not be sustained unless the
recipient is employed by the defendant or at the defendant's place of
business, or stands in such relation to him that he owes the defendant
a duty to notify him of the summons.86
If substituted service of summons at a place of business is made
at the defendant's "usual place of business" by delivery to a "person
apparently in charge" according to the suggested interpretation of those
terms, the service should be sustained even without proof of actual
notice if there has been substantial compliance with these provisions.
Where substantial compliance is not present, service should still be
sustained if it results in giving the defendant actual notice, for actual
notice justifies construing the statutory provisions liberally to find the
necessary compliance.
"Reasonable Diligence"
Regardless of which type of substituted service is employed, the
new California provision requires the process server to use reasonable
diligence in attempting personal service before he can resort to sub-
stituted service.87  This condition precedent may cause problems of
interpretation in determining what efforts will constitute reasonable
diligence; more important, it relegates substituted service to a secondary
84. PA. R. Civ. P. 1009(b)(2)(iii).
85. The issue of one being "apparently in charge" can be analogized to the prin-
cipal-agent situation where an ostensible agent is deemed to have apparent authority
because the principal has acted in such a way as to allow third persons to reasonably
believe that actual authority exists. See, e.g., Hoddesson v. Koos Bros., 47 N.J. Super.
224, 135 A.2d 702 (App. Div. 1957), which states that where a proprietor by a dere-
liction of duty enables an imposter to be in a position of apparent authority and, in
such position, to defraud reasonable and prudent customers, the law will not allow the
proprietor to escape liability merely because the imposter had no actual authority to
act for him.
86. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Myers, 290 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
87. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
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method of service.
The problem of defining reasonable diligence is complicated by
the fact that only a few other jurisdictions include such a restriction in
their substituted service statutes. Although 13 states condition sub-
stituted service to some extent, only two restrict its use by requiring a
reasonably diligent attempt at personal service before substituted service
can be made.88 As a result, there is a paucity of cases defining reason-
able diligence in the context of substituted service. The concept of
reasonable diligence is often used in other situations, 9 however, and
is usually defined the same way regardless of the context in which it is
used.
Reasonable diligence is generally defined as "such diligence as a
prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs." 9° Using
this admittedly abstract definition as a focal point, it is possible, from
the few available cases, to determine the probable scope of reasonable
diligence as the term is used in the substituted service statute. Prior
to discussing specific examples, it should be noted that the reasonable
diligence requirement, because of its abstract nature and its question-
able value, is particularly susceptible to liberal construction. Thus,
even if the process server's efforts fall far short of being reasonably
diligent, most courts adopting a liberal approach should ordinarily sus-
tain service if it results in actual notice.
The defendant cannot be served by either personal or substituted
service until his home or business address or his actual whereabouts
are learned. If the process server cannot find the defendant and knows
only one of these addresses, reasonable diligence may require him to
inquire into the defendant's whereabouts or other address.91 Depend-
88. The states are New York and Wisconsin. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 308
(McKinney Supp. 1969-70); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1969).
89. See, e.g., Omnium Freighter v. Northwest Marine Ironworks, Inc., 341 F.2d
420 (8th Cir. 1965), where the issue before the court was whether or not the libelant
who repaired the ship used reasonable diligence in ascertaining ownership of the ship
as required by statute as a prerequisite to enforcement of a lien against the vessel.
90. Hamlin v. Reynolds, 22 Ill. 207, 210 (1859). Other broad guidelines have
been offered in support of this basic definition. In Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417,
427-28, 217 P.2d 373, 379 (1950), a service of process by publication case, Justice
Wolfe, concurring specially, set down certain principles to be used in deciding what
reasonable or due diligence is. These guidelines include the following: (1) The dili-
gence required is that which is reasonable under the circumstancs and not all pos-
sible diligence which may be conceived; (2) due diligence is the degree of diligence ap-
propriate to accomplish the end sought and reasonably calculated to do so; (3)
greater diligence is required in direct proportion to the value of the object of the
dispute.
91. Cases have held it not unduly burdensome to require the process server or
plaintiff to search the phone book, or inquire at the post office to determine where
the defendant lives or works. See Wilson v. O'Neal, 296 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (Dist. Ct.
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ing on the circumstances, it may be necessary to attempt to locate the de-
fendant at both his home and place of work before substituted service
can be validly made at either place.
If either or both the business and residence locations are known,
other reasonable diligence disputes have arisen in various fact situations.
The first is where the process server knows the actual whereabouts of
the defendant and can personally serve him at that place. This was
the situation in Coster v. Jenson.92 The process server left the sum-
mons with the defendant's wife, knowing that the defendant was at
a certain other place within the county. In setting aside the service, the
court said that the statute which allowed substituted service if the de-
fendant could not be found within the county 3 had not been complied
with since the process server, knowing the defendant's whereabouts,
had not made a reasonable effort to locate him.94  Similarly, the rea-
sonable diligence requirement would not be satisfied if the process
server, while not actually knowing the defendant's location, could easily
ascertain it. 95
Disputes over reasonable diligence have also arisen where process
cannot be served on the defendant but can be served on his agent, and
the agent's authority to receive service is or should be known to the
plaintiff or process server. If this occurs, as it did in Gurland v.
D'Erbstein,0 the attempted substituted service should not be upheld.
In that case the defendant was vacationing in Europe but had filed
a designation naming an attorney as her agent to receive service of
process. Because this designation was a matter of public record, the
court held that reasonable diligence had not been exercised prior to
substituted service at the defendant's New York apartment. Were it
not for the fact of this filing or some similar event, the court probably
would have sustained the service by holding that reasonable diligence
was satisfied merely by the discovery that the plaintiff was beyond the
range of personal service. Such a holding implies that reasonable
1969). However, it does not seem that reasonable diligence requires this much if either
the defendant's home address or place of business is known. As will be discussed, sub-
stituted service is a sufficiently reliable method of service that an inordinate amount of
diligence in trying to effect personal service is not required before substituted service
may be attempted. See text accompanying notes 111-13 infra.
92. 218 Iowa 1215, 257 N.W. 303 (1934).
93. Iowa Code Ann. § 11060(2) (1931), as amended, IowA R. Civ. P. 56(a).
94. 218 Iowa at 1217-18, 257 N.W. at 304.
95. See Slattery v. Adams, 279 S.W.2d 445, 470-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954),
aff'd, 156 Tex. 433, 295 S.W.2d 859 (1956). In Slattery the defendants had a residence
in Texas which should have been known and could easily have been ascertained by the
plaintiffs if not already known by them. In fact, one of the plaintiff's lawyers sent
service to the county of this residence, instructing the service to be made at the
known address of the defendant.
96. 106 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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diligence ordinarily requires no more than discovery of the plaintiff's
absence since further efforts at personal service would be futile.1
7
A third situation where disputes arise over reasonable diligence is
where substituted service is made shortly before the defendant returns
to his residence or place of business and the plantiff or process server
either knows the defendant will return soon or fails to inquire as to his
whereabouts. 98  Here the validity of the service depends on several
factors, including the number of attempts at personal service. Espe-
cially important in determining whether the attempted substituted serv-
ice should be sustained is the length of time until the defendant is sup-
posed to return to his home or business. If the time period is reasonably
short, reasonable diligence seems to require the server either to await
the defendant's arrival or to return another time in order to serve him
personally.99 If, however, the plaintiff has made several prior attempts
to serve the defendant personally, a court might sustain substituted serv-
ice even though the plaintiff knew that the defendant would be home
at a definite time in the future.
Because reasonable diligence disputes are a question of fact to be
settled by the court at the outset of the action, there must be some proof
of reasonable diligence on which the court can base its decision. The
purpose of the affidavit that the process server must file after serving the
summons is to provide this proof. 100 According to the comments ac-
companying new section 417.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
affidavit must include statements concerning "the efforts that had been
made by the affiant in an attempt to deliver the papers by hand to the
defendant personally . . . ."'0' In addition, the text of the section
provides that the affidavit should contain "facts showing that such
service was made in accordance with . . . the statute."'01 2 These pro-
visions explain what must be included in the affidavit and should settle
two common disputes over the contents and form of this type of affi-
davit. The first is whether reasonable diligence is proved by an affi-
davit consisting of blanks filled in only with the time or times when
personal service was attempted.10 3  The second involves the sufficiency
of proof in an affidavit which states that reasonable diligence was
exercised in trying to serve the defendant personally but gives no evi-
dentiary facts to support this conclusion.' It is clear under new sec-
97. Lisi v. Lang, 286 App. Div. 771, 146 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1955); see Nesi v.
Heimann, 178 Misc. 195, 33 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
98. See Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Lee, 37 Wis. 2d 263, 155 N.W.2d 153 (1967).
99. Id.
100. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 417.10(a) (operative July 1, 1970).
101. Id., Judicial Council Comment.
102. Id.
103. Blatz v. Benschine, 53 Misc. 2d 352, 278 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
104. Jones v. King, 24 App. Div. 2d 430, 431, 260 N.Y.S.2d 666, 666-67 (1965).
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tion 417.10 that reasonable diligence would not be proved in either
case. The explicit Judicial Council Comment to the new provision on
proof of service allows a court to avoid most of the complicated disputes
and to summarily reject inadequate affidavits as proof of reasonable
diligence.'
0 5
A final problem of proof is whether a certain number of attempts
at personal service is necessary to show reasonable diligence. Generally,
the question of reasonable diligence can be said not to turn on the
number of attempts at personal service for the simple reason that
circumstances vary so much from case to case that no specific number
of attempts could be held sufficient.' 016 If, for example, the process
server learns on his first attempt that the defendant is vacationing out-
side the country, this single attempt may satisfy reasonable diligence
and allow substituted service to be made..0 7  On the other hand, nu-
merous attempts to personally serve process at one place probably
would not satisfy reasonable diligence if the defendant did not live or
work there.'0 8 Courts, therefore, should attempt "to avoid protracted
dispute over questions of purely technical import [referring to the
number of attempts made at personal service], especially in the absence
of prejudice to a party [served]."' 0 9  Ordinarily, in the absence of any
specific knowledge on the part of the plaintiff or process server, it
seems that two or three attempts at personal service at a proper place
should fully satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence and allow
substituted service to be made."x0
Although defining "reasonable diligence" involves several prob-
lems, there is no problem in seeing that the very presence of the pro-
vision, whatever its definition, inhibits the use of substituted service
and effectively relegates it to a secondary method of serving process.
This demotion is both undesirable and unwarranted. The "reasonable
diligence" requirement is undesirable because it unnecessarily burdens
105. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the presumptions which attach to
the affidavit and the use of extrinsic evidence to support or attack the contents of the
affidavit. It is assumed here that the affidavit is determinative of the facts of the
service; no extrinsic factors will be considered.
106. See Huntington Util. Fuel Corp. v. McLoughlin, 45 Misc. 2d 79, 255 N.Y.S.2d
679 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Siegal, Biannual Survey of New York Practice: pt. V, 40
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 125, 139 (1965).
107. Lisi v. Lang, 286 App. Div. 771, 146 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
108. Siegal, supra note 106, at 139.
109. Huntington Util. Fuel Corp. v. McLoughlin, 45 Misc. 2d 79, 81, 255 N.Y.S.
2d 679, 681 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
110. See Bonnefin v. Perkins, 32 App. Div. 2d 722, 300 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969),
which held that there was enough evidence to establish the place where personal serv-
ice was attempted as the defendant's then present residence and that three attempted
services on these premises satisfied the diligence requirement. Id. at 724, 300 N.Y.S.2d
at 384.
May 1970] SUBSTITUED SERVICE 1277
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the plaintiff in serving the defendant, especially in the not uncommon
case where the defendant tries to avoid the process server. It is un-
warranted because it does not significantly increase the likelihood of
the defendant receiving actual notice, nor is it necessary to justify the
use of substituted service.
Several strong arguments can be made in support of the elimina-
tion of the reasonable diligence requirement. One is that the experience
of many American jurisdictions has shown substituted service to be an
adequate primary method of service. Although not as foolproof as
the common law personal service, substituted service has been a pri-
mary method of service in the federal courts for over 100 years"' and
is recognized in 43 states other than California;" 2 only six of these
states relegate it to a totally secondary method of service."
3
Recent attacks on the efficacy of personal service lend further
support to the argument for more accessible substituted service." 4
It is often argued that personal service was originally required because
it was the only feasible way by which the defendant could receive actual
notice; there were no telephones and postal service, if available, was un-
reliable." 5 Today, of course these reasons for requiring personal serv-
ice no longer obtain, and since personal service is both time consuming
and expensive, its feasibility is questionable in many instances."" Sub-
stituted service, where unencumbered by reasonable diligence require-
ments, aids in saving time and money because it reduces the amount of
time a process server must spend in trying to locate the defendant. In
111. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
112. See note 3 supra.
113. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAw § 308 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1969). Other jurisdictions that make substituted service com-
pletely subordinate to personal service are Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, and Mississippi.
Another seven states impose lesser restrictions on the use of substituted service. See,
e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(4)(e) (1953) (authorizes substituted service if de-
fendant absent from his abode when personal service attempted there); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-51, 8-56 (1957) (authorizes substituted service when defendant not found at
usual place of abode). Other states that condition to some degree the use of sub-
stituted service are Kansas, Massachusetts, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas.
114. See Comment, Personal Service of Process-An Outdated Concept?, 28 U.
PIrrT. L. REv. 319 (1966). For a general discussion see Sunderland, The Problems
of Jurisdiction, 4 TEXAS L. REV. 429 (1926), where the author states: "Now since the
whole purpose of the notice is to convey information, no merely formal objection of
any kind should be tenable and the substantial and only question in any case should be
whether the purpose was sufficiently well-served . . . . It ought to be a matter of
indifference how a notice arrives if the fact of its delivery is the substantial end to
be accomplished." Id. at 444.
115. Comment, Personal Service of Process-An Outdated Concept?, 28 U. Prrr.




addition, several jurisidictions, including California, 117 have adopted
new and practical primary methods of service, principally by mail,"1
8
that will apparently stand up to the stringent notice requirements which
the Supreme Court has maintained."19 It seems incongruous that Cali-
fornia should allow primary service to be made by mail but not allow
it to be made by a more thoroughly proven method of serving process,
substituted service.
The reasonable diligence requirement seems even more unneces-
sary in light of the inherent strictness of the rest of the new California
provision on substituted service. In addition to the normal require-
ments for substituted service, the California statute requires the plaintiff
to mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant. 20
Only three other states impose such a requirement in their substituted
service statutes.'2' The California provision also contains a strict age
requirement, which provides that the recipient of the service be a "com-
petent" person "at least 18 years of age." No other state is stricter
than California in this regard. 2   These additional provisions increase
the already strong probability that the defendant's right to reasonable
notice will not be impaired by substituted service and make the require-
ment of reasonable diligence superfluous.
Conclusion
In summary, it seems that the requirement of "reasonable diligence"
in the new California statute unnecessarily restricts the use of substituted
service without significantly improving the likelihood that the defendant
will receive actual and timely notice. Since the requirement does little
except delay service of process, there is no real justification for its in-
117. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 415.30, 415.40 (operative July 1, 1970).
118. Comment, Personal Service of Process-An Outdated Concept?, 28 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 319, 325-26 (1966); see, e.g., MD. R.P. 104(b)(2).
119. F. JAMES, CiviL PROCEDURE § 12.11, at 640-51 (1965). Professor James
points out that the defendant must always receive reasonable notice of the action, and
that although courts' insistence on physical power over the defendant is becoming
more and more attenuated, an overall trend may be seen that indicates more careful
scrutiny of notice to him.
120. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
121. Only Illinois, Maryland and New York require the supplemental mailing.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13.2 (Smith-Hurd 1968); MD. R.P. 104(h)(1); N.Y.
Cirv. PPRc. LAw § 308 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70). It should be noted that the New
York statute places as much emphasis on the fact of mailing as it does on the sub-
stituted service.
122. Some jurisdictions do have the same age limit. E.g., IOWA R. ClV. P. 56(a).
Several states allow service to be left with a younger person. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 262.06 (Supp. 1969) (person receiving summons must be at least 14 years of age).
Other jurisdictions have no specific age requirement. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1),
which requires summons to be left with a "person of suitable age and discretion:'
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clusion in the statute. Preferably, the requirement should be deleted.
If it is not, then the courts should recognize its futility and be liberal
in finding compliance with the reasonable diligence requirement so that
service can be sustained where there has been compliance with the rest
of the statute or the defendant has received actual notice.
The efficacy of substituted service on individuals will depend to
a great extent upon the courts' willingness to construe the statutory
provisions liberally where the defendant receives actual notice. In such
circumstances, a liberal construction is justified because the defendant
has not been prejudiced by the plaintiffs failure to substantially comply
with the statute. In no case, however, should the judicial interpretation
result in an artificial or unnatural construction of the statute. There
should not be such a total lack of compliance that the only support for
sustaining the service is the fact that the defendant received actual
notice. Because the statute provides the basis for the court's exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant, its provisions should never be com-
pletely ignored.
Philip Craig Storti*
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